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A REMEDY FORECLOSED?  MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE AND THE FAIR DEBT 
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
Richard D. Gage* 
 
During the Global Financial Crisis, millions of homeowners received 
foreclosure notices.  Many of these notices were sent by attorneys, and 
informed consumers of an impending mortgage foreclosure.  Courts are 
split on whether foreclosures must conform with the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA).  In order to be subject to the FDCPA, an entity 
must meet the statutory definition of “debt collector.”  Courts struggle with 
whether foreclosure attorneys fall under this definition.  This Note examines 
this conflict, and suggests a fact-sensitive framework for evaluating 
whether foreclosure attorneys are debt collectors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Three attorneys—Smith, Jones, and Rogers1—practice at separate firms 
in one of the many states that allow both judicial and nonjudicial 
foreclosure.2  Each has as his primary business the enforcement of 
mortgages through the process of nonjudicial foreclosure.  In order to 
comply with the state’s nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, each attorney 
sends an identical foreclosure notice to every homeowner.3  The foreclosure 
notices do not verify the debt,4 and do not contain the mini-Miranda 
warning5 required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act6 (FDCPA).  
They also never demand repayment in the notice. 
Although the attorneys have similar practices and use identical 
nonjudicial foreclosure notices, there are some differences in how each 
attorney runs his practice.  Smith’s sole practice area is nonjudicial 
foreclosure.  His notices only inform consumers of the pending nonjudicial 
 
 1. Attorneys Smith, Jones, and Rogers and their law practices are entirely fictitious. 
 2. For a discussion on the difference between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure, see 
infra Part I.B.2. 
 3. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 4. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 5. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006). 
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foreclosure sale.  In addition to his nonjudicial foreclosure practice, Jones 
also does a non-trivial amount of traditional debt collection (e.g., mail 
dunning letters) on a consistent basis.  Finally, Rogers’s practice also 
includes a consistent, non-trivial amount of judicial foreclosure that always 
includes a demand for a deficiency judgment, but he otherwise does not 
demand payment from consumers. 
Several recipients of these notices realize that they have colorable claims, 
and file three distinct class actions against Smith, Jones, and Rogers for 
FDCPA violations.  However, there is a circuit split regarding whether 
foreclosure attorneys are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA.7  Are Smith, 
Jones, and Rogers “debt collectors”? 
This Note answers this question, and advocates a consistent framework to 
analyze different requirements under the FDCPA.8  Part I of this Note 
provides background information on the FDCPA, mortgage foreclosure, 
and the interplay of the two that has led to the circuit split.  Part II explores 
the circuit split.  Finally, Part III offers a consistent framework for assessing 
whether the FDCPA covers mortgage foreclosure. 
I.  LAYING THE FOUNDATION:  BACKGROUND ON THE FDCPA AND 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
Before analyzing the conflict among the circuits, this Note provides 
background information on the FDCPA and mortgage foreclosure.  Part I.A 
begins with an overview of the FDCPA and explains the areas implicated in 
the typical mortgage foreclosure.  Next, Part I.B discusses the basics of 
mortgages and foreclosure, and examines the differences between judicial 
and nonjudicial foreclosure.  Finally, Part I.C examines three clauses in the 
FDCPA that circuit courts have analyzed in addressing whether mortgage 
foreclosure is covered by the FDCPA. 
A.  The FDCPA’s Purpose and Effect 
In deciding whether Smith, Jones, and Rogers fall under the FDCPA, 
courts must look at the text of the statute in light of the Act’s history and 
 
 7. See Hasbun v. Recontrust Co., No. 11-60488-CIV., 2011 WL 3837158, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 24, 2011) (characterizing the circuit split as between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits 
on one side, and the Eleventh Circuit on the other); see also Eric M. Marshall, Note, The 
Protective Scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:  Providing Mortgagors the 
Protection They Deserve from Abusive Foreclosure Practices, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 
1275–81 (2010) (distinguishing circuit courts that had found enforcers of security interests 
are debt collectors and district courts that had rejected that view); Alexandra Vozza, Student 
Article, The FDCPA’s Application to the Foreclosure Process, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
640, 660 (2012) (concluding that the FDCPA does not apply to mortgage foreclosures).  This 
Note focuses solely on mortgage foreclosure and thus refers to cases regarding other security 
interests only as necessary.  This Note characterizes the split as between the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits on one side, and the Eleventh Circuit on the other. See infra Part II.A–B.  It also 
acknowledges the contribution of the Tenth Circuit in analyzing the issue without resolving 
it. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
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purpose.  As courts evaluate the text, they will examine typical violations 
and defenses under the statute, the defined terms “debt” and “debt 
collector,” and the ever-present but undefined “debt collection.”  Finally, 
courts must also consider how the FDCPA can be best enforced by private 
individuals and agencies. 
1.  General Information 
In 1968, Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act9 (CCPA), 
which includes the Truth in Lending Act10 (TILA).  Although TILA offered 
some consumer protections through disclosure requirements for loans,11 it 
did not protect consumers from abusive attempts to collect debts.12  
Recognizing a “widespread and serious national problem” with abusive 
debt collection,13 Congress passed the FDCPA in 197714 to protect 
consumers from these abuses,15 and to fill existing gaps in state 
protections.16  However, the FDCPA was also meant to be fair to ethical 
debt collectors.17 
 
 9. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006); see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, 
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1615 (2010). 
 11. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2011) (outlining regulations for extending 
credit to consumers).  TILA gave the Board of the Federal Reserve System the power to 
promulgate rules including model forms. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604. 
 12. See William P. Hoffman, Comment, Recapturing the Congressional Intent Behind 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2010) 
(indicating that the FDCPA is meant to fill a gap in consumer protection laws left by the 
CCPA); see also Presidential Remarks on Signing H.R. 5294 into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1382, 1383 (Sept. 20, 1977) [hereinafter Presidential Remarks] (noting that the 
FDCPA was a “great step forward” for consumer protection). 
 13. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696 
(listing particular types of abusive debt collection behavior such as the use of “obscene or 
profane language” and the “misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal rights”); see also 
Presidential Remarks, supra note 12, at 1382 (noting that protecting consumers from 
harassment was a motivating factor for passing the law). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692p (2006)). 
 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006) (noting that one purpose of the FDCPA is “to 
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”); S. 
REP. NO. 95-382, at 1, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696–97; Presidential Remarks, supra note 12, 
at 1382 (noting examples of consumer harassment provide during the congressional 
hearings); see also Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act:  A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV. 762, 762–64 
(2005); Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details:  Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection 
Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 267 (2011). 
 16. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696–97 (noting that thirteen 
states had no debt collection laws at that time); Griffith, supra note 15, at 763. 
 17. See § 1692(e) (noting that one purpose of the FDCPA is “to insure that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 
disadvantaged”); S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696; Marshall, supra note 
7, at 1289. 
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The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and courts interpret it broadly to 
protect consumers that owe, or allegedly owe, a debt.18  The statute 
provides rules for debt collectors in their collection efforts,19 and regulates 
the way they interact with consumers,20 as well as how they engage in 
third-party communications regarding the consumer.21  For instance, a debt 
collector may not harass any person,22 engage in unfair practices,23 or use 
false or misleading representations in its attempts to collect a debt.24 
The FDCPA also requires the debt collector to be forthright with the 
consumer about the collector’s efforts.  In the debt collector’s initial 
communication with the consumer, the debt collector must provide a mini-
Miranda25 warning to the consumer.26  This warning informs the consumer 
that the communication is from a debt collector, and that any information 
the consumer provides may be used to collect the consumer’s debt.27 
 
 18. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006); Clark v. 
Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. 
Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002); see also S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 4, 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1698 (indicating that the FDCPA uses “general terms” like “harassing, 
unfair, or deceptive” to allow courts, “where appropriate, to proscribe other improper 
conduct which is not specifically addressed”); Griffith, supra note 15, at 775 n.89 (“The 
FDCPA was intended to be broadly remedial.”).  The FDCPA defines a consumer as any 
person—not a corporation—that owes or allegedly owes a debt. See § 1692a(3) (“[A]ny 
natural person . . . .”). 
 19. See Spector, supra note 15, at 267 (“[The FDCPA] regulates the time and place at 
which the collector may communicate with the consumer, the method of communicating, 
and the content of the communication.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 20. See §§ 1692c–1692g; Spector, supra note 15, at 267 
 21. See § 1692b; Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–93 (1995).  Section 1692c(b) 
provides that a debt collector may only communicate with third parties (i.e., persons that are 
not the consumer, the consumer’s attorney, or a consumer reporting agency) to gain location 
information pursuant to § 1692b. See § 1692c(b).  Section 1692b provides that debt 
collectors may not tell third parties that the consumer is a debtor, see § 1692b(2), or that the 
debt collector is in the debt collection business. See § 1692b(5). 
 22. See § 1692d; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2185, 2229 (2007).  Specifically, the debt collector may not use or threaten violence, 
see § 1692d(1), use abusive or obscene language, see § 1692d(2), or harass a person on the 
telephone—including ringing the phone with intent to harass. See § 1692d(5). 
 23. See § 1692f; Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, 
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1386 (2010).  
Unfair practices under this section include the collection of amounts not authorized by the 
agreement creating the obligation, see § 1692f(1), and taking or threatening nonjudicial 
action to dispossess property when the debt collector has no present right to possession, or 
no intention to take possession of the property. See § 1692f(6)(A).  The section prohibiting 
nonjudicial action also applies to security enforcers. See § 1692a(6).  This Note discusses 
§ 1692f(6) in detail in Part I.C.1. 
 24. See § 1692e; Elwin Griffith, The Challenge of Communicating with the Consumer 
and Validating the Debt Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 
61, 78 (2006).  False and misleading representations include:  the false representation of the 
amount owed, see § 1692e(2)(A), the use of deceptive practices to collect a debt, see § 
1692e(10), and the use of a name other than the debt collector’s own. See § 1692e(14). 
 25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 26. See § 1692e(11); Ehrich v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (E.D.N.Y 2010); 
see also Hoffman, supra note 12, at 563. 
 27. Compare § 1692e(11) (“[A]ny information obtained will be used [to collect a debt] 
. . . .”), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (“The warning of the right to remain silent must be 
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The FDCPA also requires a debt collector to validate the consumer’s 
debt.28  After the debt collector’s initial communication29 with the 
consumer, the debt collector has five days to inform the consumer—in 
writing—of the amount of the debt,30 the name of the creditor,31 and of the 
consumer’s right to dispute the debt in writing.32  The notice must inform 
the consumer that the debt collector must provide verification of a disputed 
debt.33  It must also inform the consumer that the consumer’s failure to 
dispute the debt allows the debt collector to assume the debt’s validity.34 
If the consumer writes to the debt collector within thirty days to dispute 
the debt or to request information about the original creditor, the debt 
collector must cease collection efforts until she can verify the debt or 
provide the original creditor’s information.35  The debt collector does not 
need to cease collection efforts until the debt is disputed but may not 
 
accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the 
individual in court.”). 
 28. See § 1692g; Elwin Griffith, The Role of Validation and Communication in the Debt 
Collection Process, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2010) (indicating this provision is 
meant to inform consumers of their right to dispute the debt and have it verified). 
 29. Pleadings are not considered an initial communication for the purposes of 
§ 1692g(a). See § 1692g(d).  This was part of the 2006 amendments to the FDCPA.  See 
Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802, 120 Stat. 
1966, 2004–07 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(d) (2006)).  The amendment also 
exempts certain required notices that do not relate to debt collection, see § 1692g(e), and 
clarifies that debt collection activities could continue in the thirty-day window until the 
consumer disputes the debt. See § 1692g(b); see also Colin Hector, Comment, Debt 
Collection in the Information Age:  New Technologies and the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1601, 1610 n.56 (2011). 
 30. See § 1692g(a)(1); Elwin Griffith, The Peculiarity of Language in the Debt 
Collection Process:  The Impact of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV. 673, 719 (2008) (explaining the problem of including interest and other costs in debt 
calculation). 
 31. See § 1692g(a)(2); Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury?  Determining Deception 
or Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3107, 3116 (2010).  The notice must also inform the consumer of the right to request and 
receive the name and address of the original creditor if different from the current creditor. 
See § 1692g(a)(5); Griffith, supra note 28, at 450–51 (discussing how requesting information 
regarding the original creditor and disputing the debt are independent of each other). 
 32. See § 1692g(a)(3)–(5); Griffith, supra note 28, at 433–34. 
 33. See § 1692g(a)(4); Griffith, supra note 28, at 430. 
 34. See § 1692g(a)(3); Young Walgenkim, Student Article, Killing “Zombie Debt” 
Through Clarity and Consistency in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 24 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 65, 75 (2011).  However, although the debt is presumed valid, a failure to 
dispute is not an admission that the consumer owes the debt. See § 1692g(c).  For a 
discussion on whether § 1692g(a)(3) includes a writing requirement see Griffith, supra note 
30, at 678–81, 732–33, and Griffith, supra note 15, at 798–802. 
 35. See § 1692g(b); Michael D. Slodov, Documentation?  I Don’t Have to Show You 
Any Stinkin’ Documentation!  An Evaluation of the Verification Requirement of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692g(b), 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 156, 158–59 (2011).  Slodov’s article also discusses 
the three different views regarding what type of verification is required:  (1) forms from the 
creditor that document the debt; (2) forms that are responsive to the consumer’s dispute or 
inquiry; or (3) a declaration confirming the debt without any further documentation. See id. 
at 160–68. 
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communicate or act in a way that “overshadow[s]” the consumer’s rights to 
dispute the debt or obtain information about the original creditor.36 
The FDCPA is a strict liability statute that covers both intentional and 
unintentional violations.37  This means that the consumer does not need to 
show that she was injured, suffered damages, or actually deceived by the 
notice.38  Courts agree that the FDCPA protects unsophisticated consumers, 
with the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue going even 
further, finding that it protects the least sophisticated consumer.39 
 
 36. See § 1692g(b); Stueben, supra note 31, at 3117 (clarifying that a debt collector must 
go beyond technical compliance to clearly and effectively communicate to the consumer the 
consumer’s rights under the FDCPA). 
 37. See, e.g., Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175–76 
(9th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the Second and Seventh Circuits); see also Darren W. Ford, 
Comment, Secondary Liability Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1079, 1087 (2010) (“[T]he majority of the [FDCPA’s] provisions impose strict liability 
on debt collectors.”). But see, e.g., § 1692c(a)(3) (requiring knowledge that the consumer’s 
employer prohibits the consumer from receiving communications regarding the collection of 
a debt). 
 38. See Griffith, supra note 30, at 706; Stueben, supra note 31, at 3117 (noting that the 
plaintiff need not even read the letter). 
 39. Compare Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 
2011) (least sophisticated debtor standard), Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 
650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011) (least sophisticated debtor standard), LeBlanc v. Unifund 
CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2010) (least sophisticated consumer 
standard), Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 611–12 (6th Cir. 2009) (least 
sophisticated consumer standard), Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 309 
(2d Cir. 2003) (least sophisticated consumer standard), and United States v. Nat’l Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135–36, 139 (4th Cir. 1996) (least sophisticated consumer/debtor 
standard), with McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(unsophisticated debtor standard), and Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 
316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004) (unsophisticated consumer standard).  The least sophisticated 
consumer standard is meant to be lower than the standard for reasonableness, see Gonzales, 
660 F.3d at 1061–62; Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008), and is 
meant to protect persons specifically targeted for their lower levels of sophistication. 
Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the standard protects less sophisticated consumers 
“particularly when [they] are targeted by debt collectors”); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 
1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[C]onsumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence are 
especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes.”).  This standard is meant to “ensure that the 
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.” Clomon, 988 F.2d at 
1318.  However, it is still an objective standard, and it is not enough that the consumer alone 
was deceived. See LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194; Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319 (noting that the 
least sophisticated consumer standard protects debt collectors from liability for “bizarre or 
idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices”).  In comparison, the unsophisticated 
consumer standard adds an explicit element of reasonableness to clarify that the least 
sophisticated standard should not be read literally. See Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 27 
F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874–75 (8th Cir. 
2000).  Either way, the bar is low and protects consumers with very low levels of 
sophistication. See Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 348 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting the 
split but refusing to distinguish between the two standards because the difference between 
them is “de minimis”); Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226–27 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
unsophisticated consumer standard “does not significantly change the substance of the ‘least 
sophisticated consumer’ standard as . . . routinely applied by courts.”) (emphasis omitted); 
Elwin Griffith, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—Reconciling the Interests of 
Consumers and Debt Collectors, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 14–16 (1999) (discussing both 
standards). Courts have also split regarding whether violations under § 1692e and § 1692g 
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A debt collector that violates the FDCPA may raise two defenses to 
avoid liability.40  The first is the bona fide error defense,41 which requires a 
defendant to show the FDCPA violation “(1) was unintentional; (2) was a 
‘bona fide’ error; and (3) occurred despite the existence of procedures 
reasonably adapted to avoid violations of the FDCPA.”42  However, this 
defense is limited to clerical errors and does not apply to mistakes of law.43 
The second defense is to show that the action was done in good-faith 
compliance with a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advisory opinion.44  
However, over the course of ten years only seven requests for guidance 
were sent to the FTC and only four advisory opinions have been issued.45  
Since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act46 
(Dodd-Frank) went into effect on July 21, 2011,47 debt collectors may now 
rely on the advisory opinions of the newly created Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).48 
2.  Debt, Debt Collectors, and Debt Collection 
There are two thresholds that must be met for there to be a violation of 
the FDCPA49:  (1) the defendant must be a debt collector within the 
meaning of the FDCPA;50 and (2) the action or communication must be an 
 
are questions of law or fact, and subsequently whether a judge or jury should decide whether 
a violation has occurred. See Stueben, supra note 31, at 3132–49 (examining the split). 
 40. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 
1609 (2010); Vartan S. Madoyan, Attorneys Beware:  Jerman v. Carlisle Holds You Liable 
for Technical Legal Errors Under the FDCPA, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2011). 
 41. See § 1692k(c); Griffith, supra note 15, at 814. 
 42. Hepsen v. Resurgent Capital Servs., LP, 383 F. App’x 877, 882 (11th Cir. 2010); see 
also § 1692k(c). 
 43. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1610–11, 1624; see also Madoyan, supra note 40, at 1098–
1104 (discussing the Court’s reasoning in Jerman); Walgenkim, supra note 34, at 87–89. 
 44. See § 1692k(e); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609. 
 45. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621; Walgenkim, supra note 34, at 86 (discussing the safe 
harbor provision). 
 46. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
 47. See 12 U.S.C. § 5582 (Supp. V 2011) (providing guidelines for the designated 
transfer date); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,253 (Sept. 20, 2010) (notice of the Secretary 
of Treasury setting the transfer date as July 21, 2011). 
 48. Dodd-Frank § 1089 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a, l692k, 1692l, 1692m, and 1692o 
by striking “Commission” and inserting “Bureau [of Consumer Financial Protection]”); 76 
Fed. Reg. 78,121, 78,122 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (indicating that the CFPB 
will adopt additional FDCPA guidelines through regulation rather than advisory opinions). 
 49. See Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(providing a two-threshold test); Stagikas v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 129, 
138 n.12 (D. Mass. 2011) (same). But see Suquilanda v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, No. 10 
Civ. 5868(PKC), 2011 WL 4344044, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2011) (adding whether the 
plaintiff is a consumer to create a three part test); Murphy v. Bronson, Cawley, & Bergmann, 
LLP, No. 3:10-cv-01929 AJN (RBB), 2011 WL 2413447, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) 
(same).  However, most provisions of the FDCPA apply to any person, not just consumers. 
See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2003); Izenberg v. 
ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
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attempt to collect a debt.51  Implicit in both thresholds is that an alleged 
debt must exist.52 
The FDCPA defines “debt” broadly as “any obligation” that a consumer 
has incurred to pay for personal, family, or household expenses.53  The debt 
may—but need not—arise out of judgment,54 and courts have interpreted 
the term broadly to include various obligations to pay money.55 
The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the 
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly 
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 
asserted to be owed or due another.”56  Because the debt must be “due 
another,” the FDCPA applies to third-party debt collectors, but not 
 
 51. See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 400 (3d Cir. 2000); Akalwadi 
v. Risk Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (D. Md. 2004). 
 52. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that whether there is 
a debt is a threshold requirement); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 
1370–71 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he existence of a ‘debt’ [is] a threshold requirement . . . .”).  
However, the debt need not be valid. See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 
1998).  The FDCPA’s definition of “debt” is similar to the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of 
“consumer debt”. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006).  Most 
courts hold that a mortgage on real property is a consumer debt under the Bankruptcy Code. 
See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is difficult to conceive of any 
expenditure that serves a ‘family . . . or household purpose’ more directly than does the 
purchase of a home and the making of improvements thereon.”); In re Lemma, 393 B.R. 
299, 301–02 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (gathering cases). But see In re Ikeda 37 B.R. 193, 195 
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1984) (finding a mortgage lien was not a consumer debt). 
 54. See § 1692a(5); Schuh v. Druckman & Sinel, L.L.P., 602 F. Supp. 2d 454, 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 55. See, e.g., Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(finding the use of water services created a debt obligation); Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 
163 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the payment of back rent is both the 
“payment of a debt” and a “means by which to avoid termination of the lease”). But see 
Gulley v. Markoff & Krasny, 664 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding municipal fines 
are not debts because they are not derived from a consumer transaction). 
 56. § 1692a(6). 
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creditors.57  Creditors include those who have obtained debts that were not 
in default, such as a mortgage service company.58 
To satisfy the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” an entity must 
either:  (1) have debt collection as the principal purpose of its business; or 
(2) regularly engage in debt collection.59  A business’s principal purpose is 
debt collection if a high proportion of its business is derived from debt 
collection,60 and an entity regularly engages in debt collection when it has a 
significant volume or consistent frequency of debt collection business.61  
Thus, persons engaging in isolated or infrequent debt collection are not debt 
collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA.62  For the purposes of one 
 
 57. Id.; S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1701 
(“‘[D]ebt collector’ is defined to include all third parties who regularly collect consumer 
debts for others.”); see also MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 734–35 (6th 
Cir. 2007); ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
§ 4.2.5 (6th ed. 2008).  There are two caveats:  First, a creditor is considered a debt collector 
if it uses a name other than its own that would cause a consumer to think that the creditor 
was a third party attempting to collect a debt. See § 1692a(6); HOBBS ET AL., supra note 57, 
§ 4.2.5.  Second, a person is not a creditor—and thus may be a debt collector—under the 
FDCPA if it obtains a debt already in default. See § 1692a(4); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 
552.  Creditors are excluded partly because they are thought to have incentives to “protect 
their good will” with consumers when collecting debts because of their potential future 
dealings with the consumer. S. REP NO. 95-382, at 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1696; see also Brooks v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 345 F. App’x 260, 262 (9th Cir. 
2009); Aubert v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 137 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 58. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3–4, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1698 (excluding from the 
definition of debt collector “mortgage service companies and others who service outstanding 
debts for others, so long as the debts were not in default when taken for servicing”); HOBBS 
ET AL., supra note 57, § 4.3.10. 
 59. See § 1692a(6); see also Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll & 
Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing considerations for analysis “relating 
to ordinary concepts of regularity”); Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that they are two distinct prongs). 
 60. See Oppong v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 215 F. App’x 114, 118–19 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(looking to the low proportion of loans acquired in default to find that the defendant did not 
meet the principal purpose prong); Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 61 (noting that factors such as the 
percentages of “resources devoted to, and revenues derived from” debt collection are more 
appropriate for the principal purpose prong, but may be useful for the regularity prong); 
Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that an attorney that derived 70 to 
80 percent of his legal fees from debt collection met the principal purpose prong). 
 61. See Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 61–62 (cautioning against blurring the line between the 
principal purpose and regularity prongs); Garrett, 110 F.3d at 318 (“[I]f the volume of a 
person’s debt collection services is great enough, it is irrelevant that these services only 
amount to a small fraction of [the entity’s] business activity; the person still renders them 
‘regularly.’”); S. REP NO. 95-382, at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1697–98 (indicating that the 
definition of “debt collector” includes those who collect debts “for others in the regular 
course of business.”); Derek S. Burrell, The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:  An 
Overview Rx for Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1996).  Goldstein 
provides three additional considerations to volume and frequency:  (1) whether the entity has 
staff devoted to debt collection; (2) whether there are “systems or contractors” to streamline 
debt collection; and (3) whether there is an ongoing relationship with a creditor. Goldstein, 
374 F.3d at 62–63. 
 62. See Mertes v. Devitt, 734 F. Supp. 872, 874–75 (W.D. Wisc. 1990) (distinguishing 
regular debt collection from occasional debt collection); S. REP NO. 95-382, at 3, 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1697–98 (indicating that persons collecting debt “in an isolated instance” 
are excluded from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector”). 
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section of the Act, the “debt collector” also includes security enforcers 
when they threaten nonjudicial action to dispossess property without a right 
or intention to take that property.63 
However, there are enumerated exceptions that exclude persons who 
otherwise meet the definition of debt collector.64  These exceptions include 
(1) persons employed by a creditor;65 (2) persons whose principal business 
is not debt collection and who only act as debt collectors for a creditor with 
whom they share common ownership;66 (3) employees of the United States 
or an individual state acting in their official capacity;67 (4) process servers 
attempting to serve legal process in connection with judicial enforcement;68 
and (5) bona fide, nonprofit credit counselors.69  The Act also exempts 
actions taken that are incidental to a bona fide fiduciary duty.70   
  In 1986, Congress amended the FDCPA to remove an exemption for 
lawyers.71  Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court held in Heintz v. 
Jenkins72 that the FDCPA applies to attorneys even when their debt 
collection included litigation.73  Since then, most courts that have 
 
 63. See §§ 1692a(6), 1692f(6); Marshall, supra note 7, at 1272.  This Note refers to this 
clause as the security enforcer clause, and this Note discusses it in greater detail in Part I.C.1. 
 64. See § 1692a(6)(A)–(F); see also S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1698 (indicating that the FDCPA would exclude “the activities of trust departments, escrow 
companies, or other bona fide fiduciaries; the collection of debts, such as mortgages and 
student loans, by persons who originated such loans” from the definition of “debt collector”). 
 65. See § 1692a(6)(A); Chad M. Knight, Note, Attorney Liability Under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 85 KY. L.J. 463, 466 (1997). 
 66. See § 1692a(6)(B); Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, 718 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289–90 
(N.D.N.Y 2010) (analyzing the “affiliate” exception). 
 67. See § 1692a(6)(C); Ezra Ross & Martin Pritkin, The Collection Gap:  
Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 453, 522 & n.404 (2011) (noting that the government is exempt from the FDCPA). 
 68. See § 1692a(6)(D); McNall v. Credit Bureau of Josephine Cnty., 689 F. Supp. 2d 
1265, 1277–78 (D. Or. 2010) (distinguishing between process servers who act as “mere 
messenger[s]” and those that also harass and abuse consumers). 
 69. See § 1692a(6)(E); Yang v. DTS Fin. Grp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–60 (S.D. 
Cal. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled that the defendant was a for-profit 
organization and thus may have fallen outside the exception). 
 70. See § 1692a(6)(F)(i); Davis v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 
1108–09 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding that a guaranty agency owed a fiduciary obligation to the 
Secretary of Education, and thus fell within the exception).  This Note refers to this clause as 
the fiduciary obligation clause, and discusses it further in Part I.C.2. 
 71. An Act to Amend the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 
Stat. 768 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)); see also Heintz, 514 U.S. at 
294–95, 299 (holding that attorneys who regularly engage in debt collection are debt 
collectors under the FDCPA); H.R. REP. NO. 99-405, at 3–7 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1754–57 (explaining the need to remove the attorney exemption to 
protect consumers from the increase in attorney debt collectors).  Originally, the FDCPA did 
not cover attorneys. See Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006)); Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995). 
 72. 514 U.S. 291 (1995). 
 73. Id. at 299. 
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considered the issue have found that litigation activity, such as discovery, 
falls within the FDCPA unless it is expressly exempted.74 
In order for a debt collector’s actions to violate the FDCPA, they must be 
in “connection with the collection of any debt.”75  However, although the 
FDCPA utilizes this phrase—and similar variations76—throughout the 
statute, it leaves the specifics of debt collection undefined.77  Without much 
guidance from the FDCPA, courts have struggled with whether debt 
collection includes mortgage foreclosure, and have so far reached differing 
results when confronted with this question.78 
3.  Agency and Private Enforcement 
The FDCPA has two primary enforcers:  private persons79 and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).80  For private enforcement, the FDCPA 
allows any aggrieved person to sue,81 except for when the statute expressly 
limits standing to “consumers.”82  If a violation is found, the aggrieved 
 
 74. See § 1692e(11) (“[E]xcept that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading 
made in connection with a legal action.”); see also McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & 
Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that service of requests for 
admission fell under the FDCPA); Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 228–29, 
231–32 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that interrogatories are covered under the FDCPA). But see 
Vega v. McKay, 351 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a complaint fell outside 
the FDCPA). 
 75. See, e.g., §§ 1692a(6), 1692c, 1692d, 1692e, 1692g. 
 76. Section 1692d uses the similar phrase “collection of a debt,” § 1692d, and § 1692f 
uses “collect any debt.” § 1692f.  The definition of “communication” also alludes to debt 
collection, in that the communication must “convey[] . . . information regarding a debt,” 
§ 1692a(2), but the meaning of this phrase is also undefined. See Gillespie v. Chase Home 
Fin., LLC, No. 3:09-CV-191-TS, 2009 WL 4061428, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2009); 
Mabbitt v. Midwestern Audit Serv., Inc., No. 07-11550, 2008 WL 723507, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 17, 2008). 
 77. See Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 F. App’x 458, 460 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he FDCPA does not define ‘debt collection.’”); Gray v. Four Oak Court Ass’n, 
Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The FDCPA does not define ‘the 
collection of any debt.’”); Marshall, supra note 7, at 1271 (“The FDCPA . . . vaguely defines 
what constitutes debt collection.”). 
 78. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1271. Compare Brown v. Morris, 243 F. App’x 31, 35 
(5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that nonjudicial foreclosure is not per se debt collection), with 
McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding 
that filing judicial foreclosure is debt collection under the FDCPA). 
 79. See § 1692k (2006); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 
S. Ct. 1605, 1609 (2010) 
 80. See § 1692l; see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609. 
 81. See § 1692k(a) (“[A]ny debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this 
subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 82. See, e.g., § 1692c(a) (“[A] debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in 
connection with the collection of any debt.”); § 1692e(11) (“[F]ailure to disclose in the 
initial written communication with the consumer . . . .”); see also Montgomery, 346 F.3d at 
697 (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing under § 1692c because he was not a 
consumer); Bank v. Pentagroup Fin., LLC, No. 08-CV-5293 (JG)(RML), 2009 WL 1606420, 
at *4 (E.D.N.Y June 9, 2009) (noting and distinguishing both the broad language 
encompassing “any person” and limitations set by the use of “consumer.”); Conboy v. AT & 
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person is entitled to actual damages,83 up to $1,000 in additional statutory 
damages,84 as well as court costs and attorneys’ fees.85  If the suit is a class 
action, each named plaintiff is entitled to additional damages of up to 
$1,000, and all other class members may be entitled to the lesser of 
$500,000 or one percent of the debt collector’s net worth.86  These 
recoveries may, however, be limited at the trial court’s discretion. 87 
The FTC can also enforce the FDCPA because a violation of the FDCPA 
is an unfair or deceptive practice under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act88 (FTCA).89  The FTCA allows the FTC to commence litigation for 
damages of up to $16,000 per day against debt collectors for intentional 
violations of the FDCPA.90  However, the Supreme Court has noted that 
there is a potential “enforcement gap” when the law is unsettled, because 
consumers would have diminished incentives to bring claims, and the FTC 
cannot respond to the thousands of FDCPA complaints each year.91  In fact, 
according to a 2009 FTC Report, the FTC only brought sixty actions in the 
twenty years since the passage of the FDCPA.92 
 
T Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 492, 504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the language limiting 
violations of § 1692e(11) to those communications with consumers). 
 83. See § 1692k(a)(1); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555 
(indicating that actual damages may include emotional distress).  Courts must look at the 
nature, intent, and frequency of the noncompliance to determine the proper amount of 
damages. See § 1692k(b)(1); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609.  Actual damages for marginal or 
technical violations may be zero or close to it. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1620–21; Madoyan, 
supra note 40, at 1102. 
 84. See § 1692k(a)(2)(A); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555 
(indicating that there is a split among the circuits regarding whether statutory damages are 
calculated per violation or per case). 
 85. See § 1692k(a)(3); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555.  A 
winning plaintiff’s attorney is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the 
court. See § 1692k(a)(3); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621 & n.16 (citing district court cases that 
use the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees); HOBBS ET AL. supra note 57, 
§ 6.8.6.1 (defining lodestar as “allowable hours times an appropriate hourly rate” and noting 
the “strong presumption” that the lodestar is reasonable); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555.  
However, if a plaintiff brings an FDCPA action in “bad faith and for the purpose of 
harassment” a court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the defendant.  
§ 1692k(a)(3); see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555.  
However, it is unlikely that a court will find bad faith where a circuit has yet to decide an 
issue (e.g., whether foreclosure attorneys are debt collectors under the FDCPA). See Jerman, 
130 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 86. See § 1692k(a)(2)(B); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain 
and Nothing to Lose” Implications of the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) 
Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 821–22 (2006).  Courts will look at the resources of the 
debt collector and the number of consumers adversely affected. See § 1692k(b)(2); Knight, 
supra note 65, at 473. 
 87. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1620–21; HOBBS ET AL., supra note 57, at § 6.8.6. 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 41–58 (2006). 
 89. See § 1692l; see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609. 
 90. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), (C) (2006); 74 
Fed. Reg. 858 (Jan. 9, 2009) (amending 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d)). 
 91. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1624 (referencing state amici briefs and FTC, COLLECTING 
CONSUMER DEBTS:  THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 67 (2009)). 
 92. FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS:  THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 67 (2009). 
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Although the FTC has the power to enforce the FDCPA, it lacks rule-
making authority.93  However, the FTC has issued an interpretation of the 
FDCPA in a Staff Commentary.94  The Staff Commentary begins by noting 
that it is not a trade regulation rule or formal agency action, is not binding, 
and does not carry the force of law.95  Thus, with the exception of the Fifth 
Circuit,96 courts generally have not given the Staff Commentary Chevron97 
deference or treated it as binding law.98  Because courts may still defer to 
 
 93. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700 (noting 
the FTC’s administrative enforcement authority, but indicating that the FTC lacks rule-
making authority because the FDCPA is comprehensive).  However, with the passage of 
Dodd-Frank in 2010, Congress empowered the CFPB to engage in rulemaking. See Dodd-
Frank, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092–93 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1692a, l692k, 1692l, 1692m, 1692o (2006)); 76 Fed. Reg. 78,121 (Dec. 16, 2011) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006); Matthew R. Bremner, Note, The Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act:  The Need for Reform in the Age of Financial Chaos, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
1553, 1592 (2011); Hector, supra note 29, at 1610–11.  In December 2011, the CFPB filed 
an amicus brief in Birster v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., a case dealing with 
mortgage foreclosure and the FDCPA. See Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Birster v. Am. 
Home. Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No.11-13574, 2012 WL 2913786 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2011). 
 94. See Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg 50,097 (Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter FTC Staff 
Commentary]. 
 95. See id. at 50,101 (noting it “synthesize[s] staff views”); Griffith, supra note 24, at 63 
n.11. 
 96. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (giving the FTC Staff 
Commentary Chevron deference in holding that a foreclosure attorney was a debt collector). 
 97. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984).  Chevron outlined a two-part test for reviewing agency interpretation that asks (1) 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue;” and if not, (2) 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.  If 
Congress gave clear meaning to the statute, then that interpretation governs. See id. at 842. 
However, if its meaning is ambiguous, the agency may supply its own interpretation if it is 
reasonable. See id. at 844–45.  An agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute is given deference by courts. See id.; see also PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 368–70 (2d ed. 2002). 
 98. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995) (declining to give “conclusive weight” 
to the Staff Commentary because it was not binding); see also Gulley v. Markoff & Krasny, 
664 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the Staff Commentary is entitled to 
“respectful consideration” but not Chevron deference); McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 
455 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The FTC Commentary is not binding on the courts 
because it is not a formal regulation and did not undergo full agency consideration.”); 
Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 493 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
the Staff Commentary lacks the force of law and is therefore not entitled to full Chevron 
deference, but accepting the FTC’s interpretation because it was persuasive); Voris v. 
Resurgent Capital Servs., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1165 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that the 
Staff Commentary was not entitled to Chevron deference). But see Kaltenbach v. Richards, 
464 F.3d 524, 527–28 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the Chevron two part test to the FTC Staff 
Commentary); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1372 n.2 (11th Cir. 
1998) (citing to Chevron to support the proposition, in dicta, that the Staff Commentary 
should be given “considerable weight”); Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(declining to defer to the FTC interpretation because it conflicted with the plain meaning of 
the statute—the first step of the Chevron analysis).  With the exception of the Fifth Circuit in 
Kaltenbach, the courts that have applied Chevron to the Staff Commentary preceded the 
Supreme Court cases that clarified Chevron. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
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the Staff Commentary based on its persuasiveness, this Note refers to the 
FTC’s position on certain interpretations. 
B.  Mortgages and Foreclosures 
Beyond the FDCPA, courts must also consider the interplay between 
mortgages and foreclosures.  The following section looks at the nature and 
purpose of each. 
1.  Mortgages and Deeds of Trust 
A mortgage is a type of lien99 securing real property for the payment of a 
debt.100  The property—often a home101— is used to satisfy the debt or 
obligation in the event of default.102  The mortgagor—or consumer103—
generally has the right of possession.104  Upon default of the loan, a 
consumer has the equitable right of redemption—to render payment in 
full—and may retain possession of the property until this right is 
extinguished through foreclosure.105 
 
226–27 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference is appropriate when Congress delegates 
power to the agency “to make rules carrying the force of law”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty, 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that certain interpretations “which lack the force of law” 
are not entitled to full Chevron deference, but only deference insofar as the interpretation is 
persuasive); see also STRAUSS, supra note 97, at 371–75 (discussing Mead). 
 99. Liens are security interests in property that help ensure payment of a debt or other 
obligation. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (9th ed. 2009); LYNN M. LOPUCKI & 
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT:  A SYSTEMS APPROACH 21 (6th ed. 2009) (citing the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)); DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
MORTGAGES AND LIENS 1 (2004); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2006).  Although a 
mortgage may secure the performance of any act, the act secured is generally the payment of 
a debt. SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8. 
 100. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at 1101–02; SCHMUDDE, supra note 
99, at 1; RAY E. SWEAT, MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 17 (1981) 
(describing the “modern mortgage”).  While a mortgage helps secure satisfaction of the debt, 
a note memorializes the underlying debt. See STEVEN W. BENDER ET AL., MODERN REAL 
ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER 102 (4th ed. 2008) (“[The] note, and not the 
mortgage, . . . is the legal evidence of indebtedness.”); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8.  The 
note memorializes the repayment terms and usually contains an acceleration clause that 
allows the creditor to demand full repayment of the loan upon default. See BENDER ET AL., 
supra note 100, at 102. 
 101. SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 1. 
 102. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 97 (describing how the proceeds of the 
foreclosure sale are distributed); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 2; see also infra Part I.B.2 
(discussing foreclosure proceedings to satisfy a debt). 
 103. This Note will use the term consumer in lieu of mortgagor or debtor to track the 
language of the FDCPA. 
 104. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 95 (describing how the consumer gained the 
ability to stay in possession of the mortgaged property); 4 RICHARD J. POWELL, POWELL ON 
REAL PROPERTY § 37.02 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2011) (describing changes in the 
seventeenth century that became modern law). 
 105. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 96 (providing an account of the evolution of 
the equity of redemption to the present day); 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.02; see also 
infra Part I.B.2 (discussing different procedures for foreclosure). 
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There are two broad theories of the rights of a consumer and creditor106 
in a mortgage relationship:  title theory and lien theory.107  Under title 
theory the consumer transfers title to the creditor until the loan is repaid.108  
However, although the creditor has title, courts will generally recognize an 
express or implied agreement that the consumer retains possession until 
foreclosure.109  In contrast, under lien theory, the mortgage is only a lien on 
the property, and the consumer retains full title unless and until default and 
foreclosure.110  However, most states reach the same results regardless of 
what theory is applied,111 with some states utilizing a hybrid theory where 
the creditor gains title automatically upon default, but before foreclosure.112 
A deed of trust is another type of security interest in property authorized 
by some jurisdictions as a substitute for a mortgage.113  A deed of trust 
involves a third-party trustee that serves as an intermediary between the 
consumer and the creditor for the limited purpose of enforcing the trust.114  
The consumer transfers title to the creditor in the deed, which is held by the 
trustee until repayment or default.115  If the consumer defaults, the creditor 
may exercise the power of sale.116 
 
 106. This Note will use the term creditor in lieu of mortgagee to track the language of the 
FDCPA. 
 107. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03 (discussing the evolution from lien theory to 
title theory in England and the United States); Peter L. Cockrell, Comment, Subprime 
Solutions to the Housing Crisis:  Constitutional Problems with the Helping Families Save 
Their Homes Act of 2009, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1149, 1155 n.40 (2010). 
 108. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, at § 37.03; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 
(indicating there are roughly ten states that still follow this theory). 
 109. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 (indicating 
that the creditor “hold[s] title for security purposes only”). 
 110. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 (“[T]he right 
to possession arises upon a default.”). 
 111. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03 (attributing this to “transitional thinking” 
from title to lien theory); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 (“For practical applications there is 
usually very little difference between a lien theory and title theory state.”); Julia Patterson 
Forrester, Still Crazy After All These Years:  The Absolute Assignment of Rents in Mortgage 
Loan Transactions, 59 FLA. L. REV. 487, 493–94 (2007) (noting that the differences between 
the title, lien, and hybrid theories “may not be so great as they would first appear”). 
 112. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7–8; Forrester, supra note 111, at 494 (referring to 
the states that follow hybrid theory as “intermediate theory states”); Robyn A. Kowantz, 
Note, Property—Landlord-Tenant—The New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act Prohibits Foreclosing 
Mortgagees from Evicting Tenants of the Defaulted Mortgagor Without Cause—Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 638 A.2d 1301 (1994), 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1292, 1292–93 (1995). 
 113. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 114 (“[T]here is little practical difference 
between a deed of trust and a mortgage . . . .”); 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03; 
SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8, 89–90. 
 114. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (“[T]he law regards it not as an actual 
trust but as simply another form of security interest.”); 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03 
(noting this trust arrangement is “[u]nlike the usual trust situation” because the title is 
transferred to the trustee for a limited purpose—to enforce the trust).  Often the trustee is the 
creditor’s attorney. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8. 
 115. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8.  Upon repayment the deed is destroyed and 
upon default the deed is transferred to the creditor. See id. 
 116. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (characterizing the power of sale as a 
type of foreclosure); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–26 (characterizing the power of sale 
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2.  Mortgage Foreclosure 
Foreclosure is a proceeding that terminates the consumer’s interest in 
property, either transferring title or forcing a sale, in order to satisfy the 
debt.117  There are two primary types of foreclosures:  judicial and 
nonjudicial.118  While some courts do not distinguish between judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosures,119 several cases argue that the FDCPA applies to 
judicial but not nonjudicial foreclosure.120 
a.  Judicial Foreclosure 
Judicial foreclosure is the most utilized method of foreclosure.121  Every 
state has a procedure for judicial foreclosure,122 and many states only use 
judicial foreclosure.123  As the name implies, to initiate a judicial 
foreclosure a creditor or his representative must file an action in court to 
foreclose on the mortgaged property.124  The process is time consuming and 
costly to creditors, but it allows a neutral judge to oversee the seizure.125  
The creditor or third-party agent must serve a complaint on the consumer 
who may then assert defenses.126 
Once the court determines that the mortgage is valid and that there are no 
procedural or substantive defenses, the court calculates the balance owed on 
the debt.127  If the balance is not paid, then the court enters a final 
judgment, the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, and the proceeds are 
 
as distinct from foreclosure); see also infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of types of 
foreclosure. 
 117. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 99, at 719; 4 POWELL, supra note 104, 
§ 37.36; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–26. 
 118. See JOHN RAO ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES § 4.2.1 (3d ed. 
2010).  There is also strict foreclosure, which vests title with the creditor without a sale or 
deficiency judgment, but this is only used in three states. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, 
§ 37.43; see also SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–26 (listing strict foreclosure as one of 
three methods of foreclosure, and indicating that it is a type of judicial foreclosure). 
 119. See, e.g., Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 F. App’x 458 (11th Cir. 
2009); Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, 
P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 120. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Bank of N.Y., No. 08-cv-00205-PAB-BNB, 2009 WL 
3162153, at *8–9 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2009) (noting distinction); Maynard v. Bryan W. 
Cannon, P.C., 650 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1141 (D. Utah 2008) (noting distinction); McDaniel v. 
South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 2004) (distinguishing the 
judicial foreclosure in the present case from other cases involving nonjudicial foreclosure). 
 121. BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 419; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 128. 
 122. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.1. 
 123. See RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.2. 
 124. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.2. 
 125. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 419–20; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 128. 
 126. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32.  This is a simplification of the 
procedure, which, for the purposes of this Note, is sufficient.  For a more detailed look at the 
procedure involved in judicial foreclosure, see BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 419–20; 4 
POWELL, supra note 104, §§ 37.37–41; and SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 128–29. 
 127. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32.  The creditor must prove ownership 
of the mortgage or note, and establish standing. RAO ET AL., supra note 118, §§ 4.2.2, 
4.2.2.3. 
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used to satisfy the debt.128  Typically the consumer retains possession of the 
property until the sale, after which point the consumer must vacate.129  If 
the sale’s proceeds do not satisfy the debt in full, then the creditor may seek 
a personal deficiency judgment against the consumer.130 
There are two distinct types of judicial foreclosure:  strict foreclosure and 
executory process.  Strict foreclosure is available in only three states,131 and 
is the transfer of title without a sale.132  Executory process—which is only 
used in Louisiana133—is an expedited in rem134 procedure where there is no 
personal judgment entered against the consumer.135  Instead, a deficiency 
judgment may be obtained after appraisal.136 
b.  Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
In addition to judicial foreclosure, a majority of states and the District of 
Columbia allow power of sale foreclosure—also called nonjudicial 
foreclosure.137  For nonjudicial foreclosure, a power of sale provision in the 
mortgage or deed of trust allows the creditor to proceed to a foreclosure sale 
without judicial action.138  Upon default, instead of filing a civil action in 
court, the creditor gives notice to the consumer139 and initiates a foreclosure 
sale140 after a period of time set by state statute.141  A court will only 
 
 128. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.2. 
 129. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32 (indicating that a creditor can obtain a 
writ that entitles her to a sheriff’s assistance in putting the creditor in possession). 
 130. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 127.  However, some states do not allow 
deficiency judgments. Id.  If the sale generates more proceeds than the debt owed, the 
surplus goes to the debtor. Id. at 127–28. 
 131. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.43; see also SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–
26. 
 132. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.43; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 130; see also 
supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 133. See A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 851, 868 (2007). 
 134. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at 864 (“Involving or determining the 
status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing.”). 
 135. See Paul S. Ottinger, Enforcement of Real Mortgages by Executory Process, 51 LA. 
L. REV. 87, 92–95 (1990); Overby, supra note 133, at 870. 
 136. See Ottinger, supra note 135, at 92; Overby, supra note 133, at 870 n.82. 
 137. See RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.3; see also BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 
421 (contrasting the nonjudicial method, which lacks judicial supervision, with the judicial 
supervision that accompanies judicial foreclosure); LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 
34 (indicating that the power of sale is accomplished without filing a lawsuit); 4 POWELL, 
supra note 104, § 37.42[1] (referring to power of sale foreclosure as a “non-judicial 
alternative” to judicial foreclosure). 
 138. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421; LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 
34; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.4. 
 139. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.42[4].  The creditor must (1) notify the 
defendant of the intent to foreclose and include information regarding the debt and details of 
the mortgage; and (2) provide notice of the proposed sale. See id. 
 140. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.43[5] (indicating that a public sale is often 
required). 
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become involved if the consumer files for an injunction.142  Therefore, 
nonjudicial foreclosure offers less protection to the consumer, but is quicker 
and less expensive for the creditor.143  Where the power of sale is in a deed 
of trust rather than a mortgage, the trustee—not the creditor—provides the 
notice and executes the sale.144  After the sale, some states allow for a 
deficiency judgment against the consumer.145 
C.  Mortgage Foreclosure and the FDCPA 
Three clauses within the FDCPA—the security enforcer clause, the 
fiduciary obligation clause, and the judicial venue clause—have special 
importance when dealing with mortgage foreclosure.  This section will look 
at each in turn. 
1.  The Security Enforcer Clause 
The FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” includes the following 
clause:  “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also 
includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement 
of security interests.”146  The non-binding FTC Staff Commentary suggests 
that security enforcers—who “do not otherwise fall within the definition” of 
debt collector—are only subject to the FDCPA covers when they take 
nonjudicial action on security interests.147 
The security enforcer clause has divided courts over the impact of the 
FDCPA on security enforcers.148  In particular, this clause has been central 
 
 141. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421 (indicating that advertising may also be 
required by statute); LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (discussing California’s 
power of sale law); RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.4; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 131. 
 142. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (discussing the ways a power for sale 
foreclosure may end up in court); RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.3. 
 143. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421; LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 
34; 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.42[1] (indicating that power of sale is “widely used” and 
is the “preferred approach” where it is available because of the cost and time savings). But 
see RAO ET AL., supra note 118, §§ 4.2.3, 4.4.3 (discussing procedural requirements provided 
by statute to protect consumers, such as recording chain of title and limiting those who may 
use the procedures); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 131 (noting some state provisions are 
meant to protect consumers, such as the requirement of appraisals). 
 144. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421; LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 
34. 
 145. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34; 4 POWELL, supra note 104, 
§ 37.42[6]. 
 146. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006). 
 147. FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,108 (Dec. 13, 1988). 
 148. Compare Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(finding that the security enforcer clause includes—rather than excludes—security enforcers 
in the definition of “debt collector”), with Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 
652, 657–58 (D. Del. 1990) (distinguishing security enforcement from debt collection 
because with security enforcement there is a present right to the property); see also Marshall, 
supra note 7, at 1275–81. 
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to judicial analysis149 and scholarly commentary150 regarding whether 
persons foreclosing on a mortgage or deed of trust are debt collectors under 
the FDCPA.  Some courts have distinguished between judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.  They reason that because judicial 
foreclosure often involves a deficiency judgment against the person, it is 
distinct from merely foreclosing on property through nonjudicial 
foreclosure.151 
2.  The Fiduciary Obligation Clause 
The definition of “debt collector” includes the following exception:  “any 
person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted 
to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a 
bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement.”152  The 
FTC Staff Commentary provides that a trustee appointed solely to conduct a 
foreclosure sale does not fall under this exemption.153  The few courts to 
address this issue in the context of mortgage foreclosures have cited the 
FTC Staff Commentary to conclude that foreclosing trustees are not entitled 
to the exemption because debt collection activity is central—not 
incidental—to their fiduciary obligation.154 
3.  The Judicial Venue Clause 
The final clause at issue is the judicial venue clause.  It provides that a 
debt collector must bring an action to enforce an interest in real property in 
the judicial district where the property is located.155  One circuit found that 
 
 149. Compare Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (“Security 
enforcement activities fall outside the scope of the FDCPA because they aren’t debt 
collection practices.”), with Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992) 
(finding that the security enforcer clause does not limit, but rather enlarges, the category of 
debt collectors). 
 150. See Griffith, supra note 24, at 77–78; Marshall, supra note 7, at 1298–1300 
(analyzing the clause and concluding that it is “broader” than the definition of “debt 
collector”). 
 151. See Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 
9, 2005) (noting that the additional activity of pursuing a personal judgment qualifies as debt 
collection); McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(finding that “collecting money from a consumer” and “enforcing an interest in real 
property” are distinguishable). 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(i) (2006).  The accompanying Senate Report indicates that 
this provision was meant to exempt “trust departments, escrow companies, or other bona fide 
fiduciaries.” S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698. 
 153. FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,103 (Dec. 13, 1988). 
 154. See Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Thomson v. Prof’l Foreclosure Corp. of Wash., No. 98-CS-478, 2000 WL 34335866, at *7 
(E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2000); see also Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 
1034–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wilson and applying its reasoning to a student loan). 
 155. § 1692i(a)(1); S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 8, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1702 (“Actions on real 
property are required to be brought in the judicial district in which the property is located.”); 
FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. at 50,109 (clarifying that a debt collector can only 
bring an action based on the location of a consumer’s real property when that action is to 
enforce an interest in that real property). 
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this clause would be superfluous if the FDCPA excluded foreclosure 
attorneys or trustees from the definition of debt collector.156  Other courts 
that have discussed this clause have not had occasion to decide its 
implications on security enforcers, because the enforcers’ activities were 
nonjudicial.157 
II.  A HOUSE DIVIDED:  COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER THE FDCPA 
COVERS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
Part II of this Note discusses the split that has emerged among circuits 
addressing whether mortgage enforcers are debt collectors under the 
FDCPA.  Part II.A looks at the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which found that 
the FDCPA extends to mortgage foreclosure.  Part II.B then turns to the 
Eleventh Circuit, which held that mortgage foreclosure is not debt 
collection under the FDCPA.  Finally, Part II.C examines the Tenth Circuit, 
in addressed the issue without resolving it. 
A.  The FDCPA Covers Mortgage Foreclosure 
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits were the first to address the issue.  Their 
analysis in Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C.,158 and Kaltenbach v. 
Richards,159 will be addressed in turn.  
1.  The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue in Wilson.160  There, a 
divided panel held that a law firm could be held liable for FDCPA 
violations in connection with initiating a foreclosure.161  The panel 
analyzed both the security enforcer clause162 and the fiduciary obligation 
clause.163 
 
 156. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
“§ 1692i(a)(1) would be without effect” unless the FDCPA covered security enforcers that 
also met the definition of “debt collector”). But see Fouche’ v. Shapiro & Massey L.L.P., 
575 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787–88 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (finding that the defendant was only a debt 
collector for the purposes of § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a)); Marshall, supra note 7, at 1278. 
 157. See Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 
WL 2695795, at *3 n.3 (D. Minn. Sept. 12, 2007); Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 
2005 WL 300060, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005). But see Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 788 
(finding that a security enforcer who does not otherwise meet the definition of “debt 
collector” is still subject to § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a) of the FDCPA). 
 158. 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 159. 464 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 160. The Fourth Circuit had previously affirmed a lower court’s holding that 
distinguished between debt collection and mortgage foreclosure. See Heinemann v. Jim 
Walter Homes, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 716, 722 (N.D. W. Va. 1998), aff’d 173 F.3d 850 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).  The Wilson court considered this distinction and 
disagreed. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376. 
 161. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 377–78. 
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The defendants were a law firm hired by a bank to foreclose on the 
plaintiff’s home164 and an attorney at the firm who was substitute trustee for 
the deed of trust.165  The defendants sent a letter to the plaintiff, informing 
her that her mortgage payments were in default and that they intended to 
initiate foreclosure proceedings.166  The letter also asserted that the lawyers 
were not debt collectors, but indicated that the notice was an attempt to 
collect a debt and was sent in compliance with the FDCPA.167  The plaintiff 
disputed the debt and requested verification in writing.168  The defendants 
then initiated foreclosure proceedings in court.169 
Although contacted by the plaintiff’s attorney, the defendants sent a letter 
directly to the plaintiff to inform her of the foreclosure proceeding.170  The 
plaintiff’s attorney requested a full statement of the plaintiff’s account.171  
The defendants sent a letter directly to the plaintiff indicating the balance 
owed on the mortgage and the amount owed to avoid foreclosure.172 
The plaintiff resolved the dispute with the bank and the foreclosure 
action was dismissed.173  The plaintiff then sued the defendants for 
violating the FDCPA.174  The district court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants because it held that trustees foreclosing on property are not 
debt collectors, and are therefore outside the scope of the FDCPA.175  On 
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants’ demand for money placed 
the defendants under the FDCPA,176 while the defendants argued that they 
fell outside the FDCPA.177 
 
 164. See id. at 374; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392); Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392). 
 165. See Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392). 
 166. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374; Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392). 
 167. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374–75. The letter also provided the amount owed, the 
identity of the creditor, and the way to validate the debt. See id. 
 168. See id. at 375; Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392). 
 169. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392). 
 170. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392). 
 171. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392). 
 172. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 
(No. 05-1392) (indicating that the letter contained a demand for money to reinstate the 
account); Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392). 
 173. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 3, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392). 
 174. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375 (indicating that the action was brought for failure to 
verify the debt, failure to cease collection efforts after the debt was disputed, and for 
communicating directly with the plaintiff when it was known that she was represented by 
counsel); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) (indicating 
that the action was brought under § 1692g(b) and § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA). 
 175. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 
(No. 05-1392). 
 176. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8–9, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) 
(arguing that the purpose of the foreclosure activity was to collect a debt); see also Reply 
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, 5–6, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) (framing the 
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The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Wilson focused on whether the defendant 
law firm was a debt collector.178  However, before reaching a conclusion, it 
first looked to the threshold requirement of whether a debt existed.179  It 
then considered and rejected the distinction offered in Hulse v. Ocwen 
Federal Bank, FSB180 between foreclosure and the collection of funds.181  
Instead, the court concluded that the character of the debt remained 
unchanged throughout the foreclosure proceedings.182  Otherwise, the court 
concluded, debt collectors could exploit a loophole in the FDCPA that 
exempted secured debts from its protection when debt collectors used 
foreclosure.183  Thus, the court concluded there was a debt and that the 
defendant tried to collect it.184 
Next, the court disagreed with the defendants’ defense that they were not 
debt collectors.185  The court rejected their first argument that they fell 
under the fiduciary obligation exception.186  The court held that the 
defendants were trustees, but that they were not entitled to the exception 
 
defendants’ actions as “a law firm demanding money from a consumer,” and highlighting the 
demand for money in the letter).  There is a subtle difference here:  the plaintiff’s brief cited 
an analysis of the defendants’ foreclosure activity to demonstrate that the typical outcome 
was payment to avoid foreclosure, but her reply brief focused on the demand for payment in 
the letter sent to her. Compare Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 
05-1392), with Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, 5–6, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-
1392). 
 177. See Brief of Appellees at 5–16, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) (arguing that as 
trustees under state law, they fell under the fiduciary obligation clause, and that, because 
their primary business was security enforcement, they fell under the security enforcer clause 
and were therefore only subject to § 1692f(6)).  The defendants also argued that they sent the 
letters to accommodate the plaintiff’s verification request, not to collect a debt. See id. at 15.  
Therefore, the defendants argued that foreclosure was not debt collection because it was 
terminating a property interest rather than enforcing an obligation to pay money. See Wilson, 
443 F.3d at 376; Brief of Appellees at 5–7, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392). 
 178. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375–77 (concluding that trustees acting in connection with a 
foreclosure can be debt collectors); see also id. at 379 (remanding for consideration of 
whether the firm’s principal business is debt collection, or if it regularly engages in the 
collection of debts). 
 179. See id. at 375–77; see also Wymer v. Huntington Bank Charleston, N.A., No. 3:10-
0865, 2011 WL 5526314, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 14, 2011). 
 180. 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2002). 
 181. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376; see also Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (distinguishing 
between foreclosure and debt collection, because the action concerned in the former is the 
power of sale, not an attempt to collect funds). 
 182. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376; see also Wymer, 2011 WL 5526314, at *8. 
 183. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376; see also Marshall, supra note 7, at 1276. 
 184. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 377.  However, one should note—as a potentially 
distinguishing characteristic—that the defendant also made demands for money after the 
foreclosure proceeding began. See id. at 376–77; see also Blagogee v. Equity Trs., LLC, No. 
1:10-CV-13 (GBL-IDD), 2010 WL 2933963, at *5–6 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2010) 
(distinguishing Wilson and finding that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to support 
an FDCPA claim, because the defendant did not expressly demand payment).  Wilson 
argued in her reply brief that the demand for payment in the letter put the defendant squarely 
within the FDCPA. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 377 (rejecting the defendant’s fiduciary obligation 
argument); id. at 378 (rejecting the defendant’s security enforcer argument). 
 186. See id. 
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because foreclosure is central—not incidental—to the trustee’s fiduciary 
obligation.187  It cited the FTC Staff Commentary as persuasive on this 
point.188  It also rejected the idea that lawyers are fiduciaries under the 
FDCPA because that would render the Supreme Court’s holding in Heintz 
meaningless.189 
Similarly, the court rejected the defendants’ security enforcer 
argument.190  The court cited Jordan v. Kent Recovery Services, Inc.191 to 
support its conclusion that the security enforcer clause “applies to those 
whose only role in the debt collection process is the enforcement of a 
security interest.”192  Thus, the court found that the clause includes those 
who only enforce security interests for § 1692f(6) but does not exclude 
security enforcers whose primary purpose is debt collection or who 
regularly collect debts.193  Ultimately, the court held that the defendants fell 
within the FDCPA.194 
However, the dissent noted that defendants were fiduciaries because they 
were trustees for the purposes of foreclosure.195  It then criticized the 
majority’s “incidental” and “central” distinction as illogical.196  It also 
suggested that it was improper to defer to the FTC Staff Commentary 
because it conflicted with the text of the statute and its legislative history, 
and was therefore not entitled to deference.197  The dissent did not address 
the security enforcer clause.198 
 
 187. See id. at 377; see also Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1034–35 
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wilson and reaching the same conclusion for a guaranty agency that 
attempted to collect a student loan because the statute “exclude[s] fiduciaries whose sole or 
primary function is to collect a debt on behalf of the entity to whom the fiduciary obligation 
is owed”). 
 188. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 377. 
 189. Id. 377–78 (concluding that lawyers are generally fiduciaries for clients, and that 
reading attorneys into the fiduciary obligation exception would be inconsistent with Heintz). 
 190. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378. 
 191. 731 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1990). 
 192. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378.  However, the court in Jordan also concluded that seeking 
to recover a car through repossession was not seeking payment of the debt. Jordan, 731 F. 
Supp at 659–60.  This conclusion conflicts with Wilson’s holding regarding mortgages and 
debt. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378; Marshall, supra note 7, at 1276–77. 
 194. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378–79. 
 195. See id. at 380 (Widener, J., dissenting). 
 196. See id. (“If the exception covers the minor unintended acts relating to incidental 
fiduciary duties, it must cover the principal acts as well.”); see also Pizan v. HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., No. C11-26Z, 2011 WL 2531104, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2011) (noting the 
dissent’s rejection of this distinction). 
 197. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 380–81 (Widener, J., dissenting) (noting the FTC Staff 
Commentary’s own limiting language, and that other courts have declined to give it Chevron 
deference).  The dissent also noted that the majority did not find that the defendants were 
appointed solely to foreclose, as the Staff Commentary suggested. See id. at 380 n.3. 
 198. See id. at 379–81. 
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2.  The Fifth Circuit 
In Kaltenbach, the Fifth Circuit also held that mortgage foreclosure could 
be covered under the FDCPA.199  The panel examined the security enforcer 
clause200 as well as the judicial district clause,201 but did not consider the 
fiduciary obligation clause.202 
The plaintiff secured a loan with a mortgage on a mobile home.203  After 
missing payments, the mortgage company notified the plaintiff that it might 
exercise its right to repossess the home and hired the defendant to initiate an 
executory process foreclosure.204  Defendant initiated the foreclosure action 
in state court, and the home was seized and sold to satisfy the plaintiff’s 
debt.205  The plaintiff sued for failure to send a notice of debt validation 
pursuant to § 1692g of the FDCPA,206 and the district court dismissed the 
claim based on the security enforcer clause.207  The court considered and 
rejected the analysis of McDaniel v. South & Associates, P.C.,208 which had 
distinguished between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures.209  Instead, the 
district court reasoned that § 1692f(6) only applies to nonjudicial action, 
and differentiated the judicial action taken by the defendant.210 
 
 199. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that an 
entity satisfying the definition of “debt collector” falls under the FDCPA even if enforcing 
security interests). 
 200. See id. at 527–28. 
 201. See id. at 528. 
 202. See id. at 527–29.  This argument does not appear to have been raised by either party 
or the district court. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, No. 04-CV-65, 2004 WL 5573414, at *1 
(M.D. La. Dec. 22, 2004) (summarizing the parties’ arguments).  The plaintiff focused his 
argument on Heintz and that the defendant was an attorney, but did not squarely address the 
security enforcer clause. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Dismissal 
at 2–6, Kaltenbach, No. 04-CV-65-C-m1, 2004 WL 3723010; Second Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3–4, 
Kaltenbach, No. 04-CV-65-C-m1, 2004 WL 3723012 (discussing the defendant’s security 
enforcer argument, but reframing the issue as a distinction between “[b]anks collecting their 
own debts to attorneys foreclosing on a security interest”).  The crux of the defendant’s 
argument was that he fell under the security enforcer clause and was thus exempt from the 
FDCPA. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3–5, No. 04-CV-65-C-m1, 
2004 WL 3723009. 
 203. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526. 
 204. See id.; see also supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (discussing executor 
process foreclosure). 
 205. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526; Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at *1. 
 206. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526 (referring to the defendant’s failure to send a 
“dunning” letter); Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at *1. 
 207. See Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at *2–3 (finding that security enforcers are only 
debt collectors under § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA). 
 208. 325 F. Supp. 2d. 1210 (D. Kan. 2004). 
 209. See McDaniel, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1216–18 (distinguishing cases that found 
nonjudicial foreclosure fell outside the FDCPA from the instant case that involved judicial 
foreclosure, because the judicial foreclosure involves a personal judgment to collect the 
money owed); see also Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at * 3. 
 210. See Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at * 3; see also supra notes 133–36 and 
accompanying text (characterizing executory process as a type of judicial foreclosure). But 
see Fouche’ v. Shapiro & Massey L.L.P., 575 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785–86 (S.D. Miss. 2008) 
(characterizing the executory process as nonjudicial). 
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit’s sole inquiry was whether the defendant was 
a debt collector under the FDCPA.211  The court looked to Montgomery v. 
Huntington Bank212 to conclude that security enforcers who do not meet the 
definition of debt collectors are only covered under § 1692f(6).213  It 
assumed for the sake of the appeal that the defendant otherwise met the 
broader definition of debt collector.214  The court then gave Chevron 
deference to the FTC Staff Commentary and concluded that the FDCPA 
applies to a security enforcer who also meets the definition of “debt 
collector.”215  It rejected the defendant’s argument that because his 
interaction with the plaintiff was not the collection of a debt, but was rather 
the enforcement of a security interest, it did not need to comply with the 
FDCPA.216  The court relied on the text of the Act to support this 
conclusion.217  Specifically, the court explained that the judicial venue 
clause218 would be meaningless if security enforcers were exempt from the 
broader FDCPA.219 
The circuit court observed that other cases220 had concluded that security 
enforcers are only subject to the FDCPA under § 1692f(6), but that these 
 
 211. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527. 
 212. 346 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 213. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527; see also Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84.  
However, the court in Montgomery did not make an express distinction between security 
enforcers that do and do not otherwise meet the definition of debt collector. Montgomery, 
346 F.3d at 700–01.  Rather, the court flatly noted that security enforcers “d[id] not meet the 
statutory definition of a debt collector” and that the plaintiff did not allege that the 
repossession company principally or regularly collected debts. Id.  It is unclear how it might 
have affected the court’s analysis if the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant was a debt 
collector.  Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit used Montgomery to support a conclusion 
opposite to that of the Fifth. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527; see also id. at 529 (remanding for further 
consideration the question of whether the defendant satisfied the definition of “debt 
collector”). 
 215. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527–28; see also Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 
450, 456 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that Kaltenbach’s deference was based on Fifth Circuit 
precedent that requires more deference). But see Marshall, supra note 7, at 1278 (indicating 
that deference was based on persuasiveness).  For a discussion of Chevron in the context of 
the Staff Commentary see supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527–28.  Other courts have held similarly. See, e.g., 
Boles v. Moss Codilis, LLP, No. SA-10-CV-1003-XR, 2011 WL 2618791, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
July 1, 2011) (noting that a security enforcer may be liable under the FDCPA if it meets the 
“general definition of a debt collector”). 
 217. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527–28; see also Marshall, supra note 8, at 1276 
(indicating that statutory interpretation is an important step used by courts to ascertain 
whether foreclosure is debt collection). 
 218. Under this section, a debt collector must bring an action to enforce a real property 
interest in the jurisdiction in which the property is located. See § 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(1) 
(2006). 
 219. Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528; see also Marshall, supra note 7, at 1278. 
 220. The court cited Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2002), and Rosado v. Taylor, 
324 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ind. 2004), as well as other cases.  In Rosado the court found that 
“[s]ecurity enforcement activities fall outside the scope of the FDCPA because they aren’t 
debt collection practices.” Rosado, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 924.  However, it distinguished 
between sending an FDCPA notice on the one hand (subject to the FDCPA), and sending the 
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courts did not address the judicial venue clause.221  The court also 
contrasted these cases with Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman,222 a case that 
supports the proposition that if a security enforcer meets the broad 
definition of debt collector she is subject to the whole of the FDCPA.223 
Further, the Fifth Circuit distinguished “general” and “specific” debt 
collection activities.224  General debt collection refers to an individual’s 
primary purpose or regular activity—it defines the individual.225  Specific 
debt collection refers to the specific communication or interaction—the 
action or inaction—between the person attempting to collect the debt226 and 
the consumer.227  Although the court did not decide whether the 
enforcement of a security interest in a particular instance was a 
“communication” under the FDCPA,228 it noted that this was a separate 
issue from whether the party was a debt collector.229  Thus, the court 
concluded that the defendant could be a debt collector under the FDCPA if 
he satisfied the general definition of debt collector, but remanded the case 
to the district court to decide whether the defendant met the general 
definition.230 
In Brown v. Morris,231 the Fifth Circuit clarified that a foreclosing 
enforcer, standing alone, is not a per se debt collector; rather, the enforcer 
must also meet the general definition of debt collector.232  In evaluating the 
 
summons and complaint for the foreclosure action on the other (not subject to the FDCPA). 
Id. at 925–26. 
 221. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528 (noting the inability to reconcile a reading of the 
security enforcer clause that excludes security enforcers from the definition of “debt 
collector” and § 1692i, which “is directed at persons enforcing security interests”). 
 222. 823 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1992). 
 223. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528.  In Zartman, the court was dealing with a claim 
under § 1692i. Zartman, 823 P.2d at 122.  It found that the security enforcement clause 
broadened the definition of debt collectors for § 1692f(6) and that “any person who qualifies 
under the first sentence in the definition [of debt collector] is a debt collector” under the 
FDCPA. Id. at 124–25. 
 224. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528–29 (rejecting the idea that an entity enforcing a 
security interest in a particular instance was not a debt collector); see also Memmott v. 
OneWest Bank, FSB, No. 10-3042-CL, 2011 WL 1560985, at *9 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2011), 
adopted as modified, 2011 WL 1559298 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2011); Fouche’ v. Shapiro & 
Massey L.L.P., 575 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784 (S.D. Miss. 2008); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, 
LLP, No. 1:07-cv-0274-DFH-TAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2007).  
This Note adopts this distinction in Part III. 
 225. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528–29; Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84. 
 226. This roundabout way of saying debt collector is deliberate—not everyone who 
communicates with a consumer regarding a debt meets the statutory definition of debt 
collector. 
 227. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529 & n.5. 
 228. See id. (declining to express an opinion); Overton, 2007 WL 2413026, at *6. 
 229. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529; Overton, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4, *6. 
 230. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529. 
 231. Brown v. Morris, 243 F. App’x 31 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 232. Morris, 243 F. App’x at 35; Memmott v. OneWest Bank, FSB, No. 10-3042-CL, 
2011 WL 1560985, at *10 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2011), adopted as modified, 2011 WL 1559298 
(D. Or. Apr. 25, 2011). 
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general definition of debt collector, the court considers the volume and 
frequency of the defendant’s debt-collection efforts.233 
B.  The FDCPA Does Not Cover Mortgage Foreclosure:  The Eleventh 
Circuit’s Approach 
In two separate cases, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that mortgage 
foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA.  More recently, however, it 
determined that a demand for payment ancillary to a foreclosure proceeding 
is debt collection. 
Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.234 was the first circuit case to 
hold that the foreclosure process was not debt collection under the 
FDCPA.235  In Warren, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the fiduciary 
exception, but rather relied on the security enforcer clause.236  It found that 
the clause exempts the enforcement of security interests from being 
considered “debt collection.”237 
The plaintiff brought an action under § 1692g(b) of the FDCPA for the 
defendant’s failure to verify the plaintiff’s debt before proceeding with 
foreclosure.238  The court framed its analysis around the absent definition of 
“debt collection.”239  It concluded that foreclosing on a security interest is 
not debt collection because a security enforcer is not a “debt collector.”240  
It relied on a canon of statutory interpretation—expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius241—to hold that the inclusion of a security enforcer in one 
provision implied its exclusion in the other provisions.242  The court cited to 
cases supporting this proposition without noting or distinguishing contrary 
authority.243 
In Ausar-El ex rel. Small, Jr. v. BAC (Bank of America) Home Loans 
Servicing LP,244 the court came to the same conclusion without referencing 
 
 233. Morris, 243 F. App’x at 35; Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 785. 
 234. 342 F. App’x  458 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 235. Warren, 342 F. App’x  at 460–61 (finding that the security enforcer clause exempts 
security enforcers from the FDCPA except for § 1692f(6)); see also Hasbun v. Recontrust 
Co., No. 11-60488-CIV., 2011 WL 3837158, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2011). 
 236. See Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460–61. 
 237. See id. at 460–61. 
 238. See id. at 459. 
 239. See id. at 460 (“[T]he FDCPA does not define ‘debt collection.’”); see also Kabir v. 
Statebridge Co., No. 1:11-cv-2747-WSD, 2011 WL 4500050, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 240. See Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460 (holding that because a security enforcer is 
included in the definition of “debt collector” for the purposes of § 1692f(6), it is not a debt 
collector for other provisions of the FDCPA). 
 241.  “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the 
alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 99, at 661–62; see also Warren, 342 F. 
App’x at 460. 
 242. See Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460. 
 243. See id. at 460–61.  The court cited to Montgomery to reach a conclusion contrary to 
the Fifth Circuit, which cited Montgomery for the same proposition. See supra note 213 and 
accompanying text. 
 244. 448 F. App’x 1 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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Warren, Kaltenbach, or Wilson.245  The plaintiff in Ausar-El defaulted on a 
loan secured by a mortgage, and the defendant initiated foreclosure.246  The 
plaintiff sued failure to comply with § 1692g’s verification requirement.247  
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.248 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused its analysis on the definition of 
debt collector and the security enforcer clause.249  It again relied on the 
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius250 to conclude that security 
enforcers are only debt collectors for the purposes of § 1629f(6).251 
In May 2012, the Eleventh Circuit again addressed foreclosures and the 
FDCPA in Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP.252  The court 
did reference Ausar-El or Warren, but did address Wilson.253  Unlike 
Ausar-El and Warren, Reese did not address whether a security enforcer 
could be a debt collector under the FDCPA.254  Rather, the court limited its 
analysis to a letter sent that contained both a demand for payment of a 
promissory note.255  Like Wilson, the court avoided finding a “loophole” in 
the FDCPA, which would have exempted security enforcers regardless of 
whether their actions could independently constitute debt collection.256  The 
court held that a communication can have a “dual purpose”:  it can serve as 
both a foreclosure notice and a demand for payment.257  Although the 
 
 245. See id.  The court did, however, find support from Montgomery. Id. at 2. 
 246. See id. at 1. 
 247. See id. at 2 (noting that the lower court found that the defendant was not a debt 
collector). 
 248. See id. 
 249. See id.; see also Comer v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:11-CV-88 (CDL), 
2011 WL 5878400, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2011) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit 
“follow[ed] the language of the statute”). 
 250. See supra note 241 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-327-MEF, 2011 WL 5358576, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) 
(noting that the Ausar-El court relied on the doctrine). 
 251. Ausar-El, 448 F. App’x at 2–3; see also Jackson, 2011 WL 5358576, at *3. 
 252. 678 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 253. See id. at 1218. 
 254. See id. at 1218 n.3 (“[W]e do not reach the question of whether enforcing a security 
interest is itself debt-collection activity covered by the [FDCPA].  That is, we do not decide 
whether a party enforcing a security interest without demanding payment on the underlying 
debt is attempting to collect a debt within the meaning of § 1692e.”). 
 255. See id. at 1214–17. 
 256. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which found it problematic that secured debt would be 
exempt under the FDCPA, the Eleventh Circuit found it untenable to exempt 
communications that served the dual purpose of debt collection and security enforcement. 
Compare Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the loophole as “immunizing any debt from coverage if that debt happened to be 
secured by a real property interest and foreclosure proceedings were used to collect the 
debt”), with Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217–18 (characterizing the loophole as “exempt[ing] from 
the provisions of § 1692e any communication that attempts to enforce a security interest 
regardless of whether it also attempst to collect the underlying debt”). 
 257. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217–18 (“A communication related to debt collection does not 
become unrelated to debt collection simply because it also relates to the enforcement of a 
secuirity interest.”); see also Birster v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 11-13574, 
2012 WL 2913786, at *4 (11th Cir. July 18, 2012) (“[A]n entity can both enforce a security 
interest and collect a debt . . . .”). 
312 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
 
Eleventh Circuit has walked back its inoculation of security enforcers,258 by 
not addressing security enforcement it remains the only circuit to find that 
the FDCPA does not cover mortgage foreclosure. 
C.  The Tenth Circuit Provides Further Analysis 
In Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C.,259 the Tenth Circuit addressed in 
dicta whether mortgage foreclosure is covered by the FDCPA.260  Although 
it resolved the case on other grounds,261 it provided analysis of the interplay 
between security enforcers and debt collectors under the FDCPA.262 
A creditor hired the defendant to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure on the 
plaintiff’s home and designated the defendant trustee of the deed.263  The 
defendant recorded a notice of default and mailed it to the plaintiff along 
with an FDCPA notice—including the mini-Miranda warning and the right 
to dispute the debt.264  The plaintiff disputed the debt and requested 
information about the mortgage.265  The defendant sent the information he 
had regarding the mortgage to the plaintiff and forwarded the plaintiff’s 
request for more information to the creditor.266 
The plaintiff responded that this was inadequate, and that she needed her 
present balance and payment history.267  The creditor then instructed the 
defendant not to reach out to the plaintiff because the creditor was dealing 
directly with her; the defendant took no further action on the foreclosure.268  
Eventually, the plaintiff and the creditor reached an agreement to pay off 
 
 258. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217–18. 
 259. 401 F. App’x 389 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 260. See id. at 395 (assuming that nonjudicial foreclosure is covered by the FDCPA and 
noting that it would not resolve the issue). 
 261. See id. at 398 (holding that the notice and letter at issue did not violate the FDCPA); 
Huckfeldt v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 10–cv–01072-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 
4502036, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2011). 
 262. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 393–95. (examining the definition of “debt collector” 
and the meaning of “debt collection” under the FDCPA); Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at 
*5 (noting Maynard’s “framing of the issue is helpful to [the] resolution of the issue”). 
 263. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 391–92; Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C., 650 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (D. Utah 2008) (noting that the defendant was appointed as the trustee 
but was not asked to collect money). 
 264. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (indicating that this was “presumably in an effort 
to comply with FDCPA requirements for debt collectors”); Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 
1140 (the notice indicated the principal secured debt, the cause of the default—failure to 
make monthly payments—and foreclosure costs); see also supra notes 139–41 and 
accompanying text. 
 265. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392; Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. 
 266. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (noting that there was no demand for payment); 
Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. 
 267. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (observing that the plaintiff replied); Maynard, 
650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. 
 268. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (noting that the defendant had no further 
communication with the plaintiff); Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41. 
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the mortgage, and the foreclosure action was cancelled.269  The plaintiff 
brought an action under the FDCPA claiming that the notice of default was 
a third-party communication,270 and that the defendant failed to cease its 
debt collection activity upon the plaintiff’s demand for verification.271 
The district court noted the split in cases applying the FDCPA to 
foreclosure actions.272  It also examined the application of the security 
enforcer clause and highlighted the tension between the limited approach 
taken by the Sixth Circuit in Montgomery, and the expansive approach 
taken by the Fifth Circuit in Kaltenbach.273  The court found that the 
defendant was only a debt collector for the purposes of § 1692f(6), because 
he was only enforcing a security interest through nonjudicial foreclosure.274  
Ultimately, the court concluded that even if the defendant was subject to the 
FDCPA, it did not violate the Act as a matter of law.275 
On appeal, the defendant conceded it was a debt collector under the 
FDCPA, and that it had provided notices as if the Act applied to it.276  Thus, 
the court focused on whether the foreclosure action was debt collection.277  
Although it found that a mortgage is itself a debt, it distinguished the 
payment of money from the sale of property in nonjudicial foreclosure.278  
It noted that other cases—such as Wilson—applied the FDCPA to mortgage 
foreclosures that also involved actions, such as demands for payment, that 
were “indisputably debt collection activity.”279 
 
 269. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392–93; Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (noting 
the foreclosure was cancelled when the defendant was notified approximately two months 
after the settlement). 
 270. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006). 
 271. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; see also § 1692g(b). 
 272. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1141–42 (discussing how courts have distinguished 
judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures, and reached different conclusions regarding the nature 
of security interests). 
 273. See id. at 1142 (reading Montgomery as excluding security enforcers from the term 
“debt collector,” and Kaltenbach as including them). 
 274. See id. (noting that the defendant was only hired for the “limited purpose” of 
foreclosure, and that there was no evidence of the frequency of his debt collection practices).  
The court distinguished another Tenth Circuit case, Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, 
L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2006), because it dealt with a judicial foreclosure that 
demanded a money judgment and attorney’s fees, while Maynard dealt with the enforcement 
of a security interest where there was no agreement to collect money. See Maynard, 650 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1143.  The court also concluded that the defendant did not violate the FDCPA as 
a matter of law, even if it did fall under the definition of debt collector. See id. at 1142–45.  
The court called the mailing of the FDCPA notice “problematic,” but found that the FDCPA 
only requires the cessation of additional collection efforts—not the undoing of ongoing 
foreclosure procedures. See id. at 1144.  It also noted that the notice of default was required, 
and that the plaintiff consented by signing the deed of trust. See id. at 1143. 
 275. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1144–45. 
 276. See Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C., 401 F. App’x 389, 393–94 (accepting this 
admission “for purposes of this case”). 
 277. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 394.  The court also considered the notice and letter 
sent to the plaintiff as outside the scope of its analysis on foreclosure. Id. at 395–98. 
 278. See id. at 394; Huckfeldt v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 10–cv–01072-
MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 4502036, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2011). 
 279. Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 394. 
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The Tenth Circuit also noted that some cases had distinguished 
nonjudicial and judicial foreclosure, because judicial foreclosure involves a 
personal judgment.280  For example, McDaniel found that because the 
foreclosure at issue included a demand for personal judgment, the 
foreclosure was an attempt to collect a debt, rather than a mere foreclosure 
on the plaintiff’s interest in the property.281 
The court then cited with approval the Seventh Circuit’s Gburek v. Litton 
Loan Servicing LP282 to hold that a demand for payment is not required, 
because the purpose of the letter controls—the inclusion of FDCPA 
language is legally irrelevant.283  However, the Tenth Circuit ultimately did 
not answer whether foreclosure was debt collection, because it determined 
that the defendant’s communications with the plaintiff did not violate the 
FDCPA.284 
III.  A BLUEPRINT FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 
Part III attempts to resolve the conflict among the circuits.  Part III.A 
reevaluates the conflict and constructs a framework for analyzing FDCPA 
cases, with particular emphasis given to those that involve mortgage 
foreclosure.  Finally, Part III.B suggests legislation to amend the FDCPA to 
prevent some of the inconsistent results that would otherwise arise from a 
strict reading of the current language in the FDCPA. 
A.  A Framework for Avoiding Confusion 
One cause of the conflict is that courts do not consistently address the 
same issues:  while some have looked to whether a mortgage is a “debt,”285 
others have focused on the definition of “debt collector”286 or debt 
collection.287  In other words, courts have reached different answers 
because they have asked different questions.  A consistent framework is 
therefore needed to reach fair results. 
Many courts already implicitly apply this framework,288 and other courts 
evaluating FDCPA claims could also easily utilize it.  However, for 
 
 280. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 394–95; Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at *4. 
 281. See McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 2004). 
But see Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 
2005) (distinguishing McDaniel because the defendant had not sought a personal judgment 
against the plaintiff). 
 282. 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 283. Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 395; Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at *4.  Gburek 
involved a letter inviting the plaintiff to discuss “foreclosure alternatives.” Gburek, 614 F.3d 
at 386.  The court rejected a brightline rule requiring an explicit payment demand in favor of 
a “commonsense inquiry” that looked at different factors such as:  (1) the relationship 
between the parties; (2) “the purpose and context of the communications—viewed 
objectively”; and (3) whether there is an explicit demand for payment. Id. at 384–85. 
 284. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 395–98; Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at *4. 
 285. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 211, 249 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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mortgage foreclosure, this explicit framework is particularly useful to 
untangle the interwoven definitions.289 
The proposed framework is a three-threshold test290:  First, there must be 
an alleged debt.291  Second, the individual action or communication at issue 
must involve a debt (i.e., specific debt collection).  Third, the defendant 
must be involved in general debt collection so that it meets the definition of 
“debt collector.”  This means the defendant must either (1) have debt 
collection as the principal purpose of its business;292 or (2) regularly collect 
(or attempt to collect) debts.293 
1.  A Mortgage Is a Debt 
To reach the second and third thresholds, there must first be an alleged 
debt.294  A mortgage, as a type of security interest, represents an obligation 
to pay money.295  When a mortgage secures the purchase of a home,296 it 
qualifies as a consumer debt, and therefore fits comfortably in the FDCPA’s 
broad definition of debt.297  Thus, a home mortgage is a debt, and the three 
cases involving the attorneys from the Introduction all involve a “debt” as 
defined by the FDCPA.  
2.  A Communication or Action Regarding Mortgage Foreclosure Is 
Specific Debt Collection 
The second threshold concerns specific debt collection, which focuses on 
the defined term “communication”298 and the phrase “in connection with 
the collection of any debt.”299  Since “communication” is defined broadly 
as the “conveying of information regarding a debt,” any communication 
regarding a mortgage—a debt—satisfies the definition. 
Although “debt collection” is not defined in the statute,300 absent 
language to the contrary, it should be interpreted broadly to meet the 
remedial purpose of the FDCPA.301  Although this phrase is similar to the 
one used to define “debt collector” (i.e., general debt collection), there are 
two distinctions.  First, there is no language indicating that the specific debt 
 
 289. See supra notes 146–47, 224–32 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.  However, if the mortgage is 
securing a different type of loan that was not for personal, family, or household purposes, it 
would not be a debt under the FDCPA. 
 298. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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collection may be “directly or indirectly” collected.302  This indicates that 
specific debt collection must be direct.  Second, there is no security enforcer 
clause for specific debt collection.  Thus, specific debt collection—
interpreted broadly to achieve the remedial purpose of the FDCPA—
includes actions taken in connection with mortgage foreclosure.  This holds 
true regardless of whether the foreclosure is judicial or nonjudicial, or 
whether there is a demand for money. 
Therefore, communications or actions regarding mortgage foreclosure 
satisfy the second prong of the framework.  Because the three attorneys 
from the Introduction—Smith, Jones, and Rogers—all sent communications 
in their attempts to mortgage debts, they satisfy the second threshold of the 
framework. 
3.  An Entity Whose Principal Purpose Is Security Enforcement Is a 
Debt Collector Only If It Also Regularly Collects Debts 
The third and final threshold examines general debt collection.  One of 
two realities must hold true to satisfy this threshold:  the entity must either 
(1) have debt collection as its principal purpose; or (2) it must regularly 
collect debts. 
a.  A Security Enforcer’s Principal Purpose Is Not Debt Collection 
For general debt collection, an entity’s principal purpose is defined by a 
high percentage or proportion of debt collection activity.303  In the case of 
security enforcers, it appears as though their principal purpose is already 
defined:  the enforcement of security interests.  Therefore, their principal 
purpose cannot be the collection of debts.304  Smith, Jones, and Rogers—
the three attorneys from the Introduction—fail to satisfy this prong of the 
third threshold, because their principal purpose is the enforcement of 
mortgages—a security interest—through foreclosure. 
b.  Whether a Security Enforcer Is a Debt Collector Depends on Whether It 
Also Regularly Collects Debts 
Although the attorneys do not satisfy the first prong of the third 
threshold, they may still satisfy the second prong if they regularly collect 
debts.  This is determined by an examination of the volume and frequency 
of the attorneys’ debt collection.305 
Because general debt collection contains the security enforcer clause, this 
suggests that the enforcement of security interests, such as a mortgage, is 
not considered general debt collection.  Thus, the rote enforcement of a 
mortgage through foreclosure—including the mailing of a foreclosure 
 
 302. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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notice or the filing of a foreclosure action—does not qualify as general debt 
collection.  Since the attorney Smith only practices routine nonjudicial 
foreclosure,306 he does not engage in general debt collection and is not a 
debt collector under the FDCPA. 
However, general debt collection can be satisfied when an attorney 
moves beyond simple foreclosure to also demand money for the payment of 
a debt.  Thus, the mailing of demands for payment or the filing of a 
deficiency judgment—either in conjunction with, or after the foreclosure—
could satisfy the general definition of debt collection if it were done with 
sufficient frequency.  Because attorney Jones consistently mails out a non-
trivial amount of dunning letters to demand payment, he satisfies the second 
prong of the third threshold and could therefore be a debt collector under 
the FDCPA, so long as he does not fall within one of its exceptions.  The 
same is true for attorney Rogers, because of his consistent filing of 
deficiency judgments, which are demands for payment to satisfy a debt. 
It is worth noting, however, that none of the attorneys would be protected 
by the fiduciary obligation exception.307  This clause does not cover 
foreclosure trustees because they are not full trustees; rather their role is 
limited to the enforcement of the deed of trust.308 
B.  Legislation to Achieve Consistent Results 
Although the reading of the FDCPA proposed by this Note is consistent 
with the Act’s text and purpose, it still reaches inconsistent results.  While 
attorneys Smith, Jones, and Rogers sent the same notice in connection with 
the same type of proceeding, two of the attorneys fall under the FDCPA 
because of their general debt collection activities, which are unrelated to the 
specific debt collection. 
In order to achieve consistent results, Congress should amend the 
FDCPA to define “debt collection.”  Congress could define the term so that 
it clearly does not include the rote enforcement of security interests—such 
as mortgages—but does include judicial or nonjudicial demands for 
payment in conjunction with the enforcement.  In this way, specific and 
general debt collection would share the same definition.  Thus, none of the 
attorneys would fall under the FDCPA since their action—the mailing of a 
notice of nonjudicial foreclosure—would not be specific debt collection 
under the FDCPA.  In the alternative, Congress could also define debt 
collection to include the rote enforcement of security interests, so that 
mortgage foreclosure would be both specific and general debt collection. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should use this three-threshold framework to evaluate whether 
defendants and their actions fall under the FDCPA.  The framework 
 
 306. See supra notes 137–45 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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proposed by this Note looks at whether there is an alleged debt, and then 
evaluates whether there are both specific and general attempts to collect a 
debt. However, because this framework may lead to inconsistent results, 
legislation is needed to clarify the definition of “debt collection.” 
 
